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Most of the research in corporate finance, particularly the
earlier works, developed theories and empirical tests in a
framework that implicitly assumed that a firm’s financial
decisions reflect the characteristics of the firm and its
financial stakeholders, namely, shareholders and bond-
holders. The underlying theme in these papers is that a firm373 4572.
. Kale), comeneghetti@mail.
ian Institute of Management
4.06.001
anagement Bangalore. Productiois a nexus of explicit contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
More recently, however, researchers recognize that a firm’s
financial decisions affect and are affected by consider-
ations pertinent to nonfinancial stakeholders. These nonfi-
nancial stakeholders are entities/agents that are
economically linked to the firm and include the firm’s
suppliers, customers, rivals, and labour. The relationships
with these agents are governed by explicit as well as im-
plicit contracts. The analyses of corporate financial de-
cisions of a firm, that is a nexus of both explicit and implicit
contracts, yield several new theoretical predictions. A
number of papers in the last decade or so have provided
significant empirical support for many of these predictions.
Our objective in this paper is to offer a summary of the
theoretical and empirical research on how nonfinancial
stakeholder interests enter corporate financial decisions.n and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The firm and its product market environment
Figure 1 The firm and its product market environment.
3 Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) investigate the effect of a different
type of stakeholder, the firm’s workers, on capital structure.
Specifically, they study the role of employee treatment on capital
structure. Consistent with the hypothesis in Maksimovic and Titman
(1991) that firms in financial distress are less likely to honour im-
plicit contracts, they find that firms that adopt more employee-
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the nonfinancial stakeholders from product markets, that
is, a firm’s suppliers and customers. In doing so, we will
ignore other important nonfinancial stakeholders such as
labour and rivals, but note that financial decisions are also
significantly affected by the labour force and by
competition.
At an intuitive level, it is easy to see why product market
considerations should be related to corporate financial
decisions. The decision maker in the firm, the manager,
considers firm characteristics, for example the firm’s asset
structure and cash flow volatility, when making financial
decisions such as the debt level or dividend payment.
However, the manager is also likely to be well aware of the
conditions in the firm’s product markets, for example, the
upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain. Fig. 1
illustrates the position of the firm in its product market
environment. Since optimal relationships with suppliers and
customers have significant value implications, it stands to
reason that the manager will take into account, conditions
in the supplier/customer industries in making financial de-
cisions. Put simply, in this paper we will try to show how
these product market considerations can affect the firm’s
financial decisions and then present supporting empirical
evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section
describes the role of supplier/customer considerations on
the firm’s capital structure. Then, we describe the research
on how management decisions affect and are affected by
investment decisions of suppliers/customers. The next
section describes studies on how shocks are transmitted
along the supply chain. We then examine the role of sup-
pliers and customers in monitoring the firm and the role of
information in these relationships. The last section offers
some concluding remarks.
Supplier/customer considerations in capital
structure decisions
The relationships between firms along the supply chain are
governed by both explicit and implicit contracts.2 As such,
supplier and customer considerations can impact a firm’s
capital structure decision through two channels. The first
relates the firm’s debt level to the investment decisions of
suppliers and customers. The second is bargaining, which
postulates that the firm’s debt level is determined as a
strategic response to the relative bargaining power of its
suppliers/customers e an increase in debt level reduces the
surplus that is available for sharing with the suppliers/
customers and, thus, increases the firm’s bargaining power
in negotiations. The seminal paper by Titman (1984) argues
that the customers of a firm manufacturing durable goods
expect the firm to provide parts and service in the future. A
bankrupt firm that is in liquidation will clearly not be able
to do so and customers will have to obtain parts and2 For example, Williams (2013) finds that the duration of (explicit)
purchase contracts firms enter into is usually one year even if there
is an understanding (implicit contract) with regular suppliers to
continue purchases in the foreseeable future.services from alternate suppliers at a greater cost. If the
likelihood of bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation of a
firm is high, customers will factor in the costs of obtaining
parts and services from alternate sources, and reduce the
price that they will be willing to pay for the firm’s products.
Titman (1984) demonstrates that firms can commit to
reducing the likelihood of liquidation by carrying lower
debt than they otherwise would have.
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) carry this argument
further and show that a consumer may be reluctant to buy a
product from a firm near bankruptcy even if she incurs no
financial costs in case of liquidation. The reason is that a
firm in financial distress is less likely to honour implicit
contracts such as, for example, product quality.3 Thus, if
firms in financial difficulties have fewer incentives to supply
high-quality products, a consumer might decide not to buy
the product or buy it only at a reduced price when the firm
is near bankruptcy. The main theme in Titman (1984) and
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) is that when a firm produces
a unique product, its suppliers and customers may have to
undertake investments that lose value if the firm is in
financial distress or if the firm liquidates. Thus, high
leverage reduces suppliers’ and customers’ incentive to
make relationship specific investments (RSI). The relation-
ship specific investment theory posits that a firm can
attract customers’ and suppliers’ RSI by maintaining a low
leverage, thus committing to avoid default and liquidation.
Later research uses bargaining theory to explain the
effect of a firm’s customers and suppliers on capital
structure decisions.4 Hennessy and Livdan (2009) developed
a theoretical model to analyse the optimal leverage of a
firm that relies on implicit contracts with its suppliers. Theyfriendly policies, as measured by the Employee Treatment Index,
maintain on average a lower debt level.
4 In an influential paper, Bronars and Deere (1991) use the bar-
gaining theory to model the firm’s relationship with labour unions.
They demonstrate that firms can use debt to reduce the surplus
that labour unions can extract, thus increasing their bargaining
power.
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bargaining power of the firm, it also reduces the bilateral
surplus that is available for discretionary payments to the
supplier, such as bonuses and rebates, thus reducing the
supplier’s incentives to make relationship specific in-
vestments. The optimal capital structure is a tradeoff be-
tween the benefit of debt and the cost in term of efficiency.
The model predicts that the firm will maintain a higher
level of debt when the supplier has more bargaining power.
Chemla and Faure-Grimaud (2001) analyse the case when
buyers have private valuation for the supplier’s product in a
two-period setting. In this case, the informed buyer has the
incentive to postpone revealing information. In such a
setting with dynamic adverse selection, the authors show
that the supplier has the incentive to increase debt in order
to induce information revelation. The authors also show
that such incentives would be greater for manufacturers of
durable goods. The model developed by Chu (2012), on the
other hand, analyses the relation between firm leverage
and the market structure of the supplier’s industry. The
main result of the paper is that competition in the sup-
plier’s industry and firm’s leverage are substitutes, since
both increase the firm’s bargaining power and reduce the
supplier’s incentives to make relationship specific in-
vestments with the firm.
Extant empirical research supports both the relation-
ship specific investment and the bargaining power the-
ories. Kale and Shahrur (2007) empirically investigate the
effect of the customer-supplier relation on capital
structure. They build on the intuition in Titman (1984)
and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) and hypothesize that
a firm uses low debt levels to induce customers and sup-
pliers to undertake relationship specific investments.
Further, they hypothesize that since a higher debt level
increases the management bargaining power, firms
maintain a higher debt level when customers or suppliers
have more leverage in the negotiation. They measure
relationship specific investments with two variables: the
customer and supplier R&D expenses and the presence of
a strategic alliance or joint venture with a customer/
supplier.
Consistent with their first hypothesis, they find that a
firm’s leverage is decreasing in the R&D of its customer/
supplier industries. Additionally, they find that when a firm
operates in an industry characterized by the presence of
strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in the
customer/supplier industry, the firms maintains a lower
debt level. In support of the second hypothesis on the
bargaining power of debt, Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that
firms whose customers/suppliers operate in more concen-
trated industries e and thus have more bargaining power e
have higher levels of debt.
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) reach conclusions
that are similar to those in Kale and Shahrur (2007). They
find that a supplier that is dependent on a major customer
that accounts for the majority of its sales maintains lower
debt levels. The rationale is that suppliers try to reduce the
financial distress costs they would incur in case the
customer liquidates its assets. They also find that firm
leverage is decreasing in the importance of purchases from
dependent suppliers for firms in durable goods industries,
supporting the hypothesis that a firm tries to attract RSI bysuppliers by reducing the likelihood of liquidation/bank-
ruptcy. The empirical analysis in Chu (2012) finds that
leverage decreases with the level of competitiveness in the
supplier’s industry, as measured by the elasticity of sub-
stitution among suppliers.
Kale, Meneghetti, and Shahrur (inpress) examine the
effect of a specific contract between a firm and its cus-
tomers, the product warranty, on capital structure. A
warranty is a contract between the producer and the con-
sumer of a product that specifies the conditions under
which the firm guarantees service and maintenance. Since
the warranty loses value if the firm is liquidated, it is
reasonable to expect the consumer to account for the
firm’s probability of financial distress or liquidation (Titman
(1984), and Maksimovic and Titman (1991)). Consistent with
the hypothesis that a firm can attract investments by
committing to avoid actions such as liquidation that are
detrimental to its customers, the authors find that firms
that offer higher levels of product warranties have, on
average, lower debt levels.
Customer and supplier RSI and firm
management decisions
There are several papers that examine the effects of
product markets on a variety of management decisions such
as risk taking, dividend policy, earnings management, and
aggressiveness in accounting practices. In this section, we
briefly describe the intuition underlying these effects and
the associated empirical evidence.
Product market considerations and managerial risk
taking and compensation
Relationship specific investments are risky for a supplier or
a customer because their value is significantly lower
outside the relationship with the firm. Therefore, when a
customer (supplier) makes the RSI decision, it should take
into account the possibility of financial distress and bank-
ruptcy of the firm. Building on this intuition, Kale, Kedia,
and Williams (2013) hypothesize that if the high-power in-
centives such as stock options in the firm CEO’s compen-
sation are high, the CEO may have the incentive to
undertake excessive risk. Higher risk increases the likeli-
hood of financial distress and, as a result, the firm’s cus-
tomers and suppliers will choose lower levels of RSI.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors find that RSI by
customers significantly declines in the firm CEO’s risk taking
incentives.
Dividend policy
A firm’s dividend policy may also be affected by the firm’s
relations with its customers and suppliers. Wang (2012)
tests two hypotheses on the relation between RSI and div-
idend policy. The financial distress hypothesis predicts that
firms that rely on RSI are more likely to experience financial
distress and, therefore, will optimally pay lower dividends
in order to reduce the likelihood of financial distress.
Johnson, Kang, and Yi (2010) provide a different explana-
tion for the negative relation between RSI and dividends.
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mation about the supplier than the average investor,
customer monitoring is a substitute for dividend payment as
a governance mechanism. A customer that makes greater
RSI will monitor more and, as a result, the firm will need to
pay lower dividends.
Wang (2012) finds that firms that rely more on customer-
supplier relationships indeed pay significantly lower divi-
dends. Consistent with the financial distress hypothesis, the
author finds that the results are stronger for firms more
likely to be in financial distress. Contrary to the prediction
of the certification hypothesis, the author finds that there
is no difference in the relation between RSI and dividend
payments across firms that differ in terms of free cash flow
or governance as measured by the G-Index developed in
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
Earnings management and accounting conservatism
Raman and Shahrur (2008) examine the role of RSI by cus-
tomers and suppliers on a different firm policy, earnings
management. A firm can attract RSI by customers and
suppliers by improving the informational content of its
earnings. This can be achieved by removing the earnings’
transitory component. Alternatively, a firm can attract RSI
by increasing revenues through accounting manipulation.
Consistent with both hypotheses, Raman and Shahrur (2008)
find a positive relation between industry-level measures of
customer and supplier RSI and the firm’s discretionary ac-
cruals. At the firm level the result holds only for the sup-
pliers, while high level of customer RSI is related to lower
earnings management activities. A potential explanation
for this result is that firms prefer to report lower earnings
when they have a bargaining disadvantage with the
customer. Further, the authors find that the levels of
customer and supplier RSI are negatively associated with
measures of income smoothing, suggesting that firms
manipulate earnings in order to boost revenues rather than
to improve earnings’ informational content.
Customers and suppliers can also affect a firm’s ac-
counting policies. Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012) find that
firms are more conservative in their accounting practices
and recognize losses more quickly when their customers
and suppliers have more bargaining power. Supporting the
hypothesis that the result is driven by the relative bargai-
ning power of the firm against its suppliers and customers,
the positive effect of customers’ and suppliers’ bargaining
power on the firm’s accounting conservatism is stronger if
the firm operates in a material intensive industry, one that
uses relatively more material than labour input, and if it
produces unique goods. It is weaker when the firm operates
in an industry with high barriers to entry and when its
customer operates in a material intensive industry.
Spillover effects along the supply chain
A supply chain implies that firms are economically linked to
each other and these economic linkages become more
binding when up- and downstream firms make significant
levels of RSI. It then stands to reason that the effect of an
event or an exogenous shock to a firm will have significanteffects on firms that are economically linked to it, and that
this effect should be reflected in these firms’ stock prices
and operating performance.
Shocks to supplier/customer and firm’s stock
returns
Rational investors should be aware of the supplier-customer
link and, therefore, should immediately respond to news
about a linked firm. If, however, limited attention on the
part of investors results in this link being ignored, a firm’s
stock price will react to the shock to the supplier/customer
firm’s stock price, only with a lag. This delay in information
transmission will result in predictability in the firm’s stock
returns. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that the strategy of
buying shares of firms whose customers had the most pos-
itive stock returns and short-selling shares in firms whose
customers had the most negative returns yields economi-
cally significant positive abnormal returns. The authors also
find that when investors are likely aware of a firm’s supply-
chain links, as in the case of institutional investors holding
both customers and suppliers shares, the return predict-
ability is significantly less. These results support the in-
vestors’ limited attention hypothesis. Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) do find that the lag is significant only in the stock
price reactions of upstream firms. Along similar lines,
Menzly and Ozbas (2010) use the customer-supplier links to
test the gradual diffusion of information hypothesis. They
find that stocks in related customer and supplier industries
cross predict each other’s returns and that stock predict-
ability is lower when analyst coverage is extensive.
Huang and Kale (in press) examine the effects of eco-
nomic linkages in the context of mutual fund performance.
Almost all mutual funds have one industry, which they call
the “main” industry, in which their investment is the
highest. Fund managers may concentrate investment in an
industry either because of superior information/ability/
effort or because of speculation or herding motives. Huang
and Kale (in press) present a theoretical model which pre-
dicts that “better” mutual fund managers will invest more
in industries that are economically linked to the main in-
dustry because they will likely have lower costs of obtaining
information on these related industries. The model,
therefore, predicts that funds with greater investments in
these related industries will exhibit better return perfor-
mance. The authors then provide empirical evidence which
supports this prediction.
Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009) investigate the effect of
a firm’s leverage buyout (LBO) on its suppliers. They find
that around an LBO announcement, suppliers experience a
negative abnormal return, and that the stock returns are
even more negative for suppliers that are more economi-
cally dependent on the firm. Finally, they also show that
the suppliers’ operating margins decline after their cus-
tomer’s LBO. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that
an LBO gives a firm more bargaining power in its relations
with the supplier.
Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi (2011) investigate how a
supplier’s financing decisions, specifically a seasoned eq-
uity offering (SEO), affect supplier-customer relations. The
hypothesis is that an SEO sends a negative signal about the
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incentives to cooperate. Consistent with the hypothesis,
they find that a firm’s SEO announcement is characterized
by negative customer and supplier cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) around the event, a decline in relationship
specific investments (RSI) and importance of customer
sales, and a significant reduction in the duration of the
relationship. This effect is more severe when bankruptcy
costs are high, the relation is characterized by high RSI,
information asymmetries are significant, and when the
supplier’s product requires post-sales support.
Financial distress and bankruptcy
When a firm experiences financial distress or has to file for
bankruptcy, it is likely that all the firm’s stakeholders will
be affected. For example, the wealth effects of a firm’s
bankruptcy will ripple along the supply chain and affect the
firm’s customers and suppliers. Baranchuk and Rebello
(2011) present a model which predicts that a firm’s bank-
ruptcy affects firms along the supply chain because of the
spillover from the restructuring of a distressed firm to ri-
vals, suppliers, and customers.
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) empirically
investigate this claim, and study the wealth effects of
financial distress and bankruptcy filings for customers and
suppliers of the filing firm. They find significant evidence of
linkages and contagion among firms along the supply chain.
They find that the suppliers of filing firms experience
negative abnormal returns during bankruptcy filing and in
the pre-filing distress period. However, they do not find
evidence of contagion to the customers of the filing firms.
They also find that contagion to suppliers is more severe
when the filing firm industry also experiences negative
abnormal returns.
Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian (2012) examine the effect
of a firm’s Chapter 11 filing and pre-filing financial distress
on its suppliers and customers. They find that suppliers
experience a negative abnormal return around the pre-
filing distress date, and that the CAR is even more nega-
tive when the filing firm has a low probability of reorgani-
zation. The authors show that the negative CARs are a
prelude to a deteriorating operating performance. Inter-
estingly, results show that the suppliers continue to extend
credit to their distressed customers, which suggests that
suppliers indeed have an incentive to avoid the firm’s
liquidation.5
When firms enter financial distress, they may also alter
their product quality decisions (Maksimovic and Titman
(1991)). Phillips and Sertsios (2013) investigate the rela-
tion between financial distress, bankruptcy, and product
quality in the airline industry. They find that product
quality, measured in terms of mishandled baggage and on-
time performance, declines when airlines are in financial
distress and increases when airlines are in bankruptcy.5 Suppliers can take some precautionary measures to limit the
negative effect of their customers’ financial distress or bankruptcy.
Itzkowitz (2013), for example, shows that suppliers with important
customers hold, on average, higher levels of cash as a precaution
against the loss of the customer.Hortac¸su, Syverson, Matvos, and Venkataraman (2013)
examine the effect of financial distress on the provision
of services such as maintenance and warranties, which
customers receive along with the main product, in the auto
manufacturing industry. Consistent with the intuition that a
firm’s financial difficulties can disrupt the provision of these
services and thus reduce the price a customer is willing to
pay for the product, they find that an auto manufacturer’s
financial distress is followed by a drop in the car prices,
especially for cars that still have a long service life and thus
are more likely to require maintenance and parts.
CEO turnovers
Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh (2013) investigate the effect
of a CEO’s replacement on the firm’s suppliers. They find
that suppliers experience lower sales in the years following
the customer’s CEO replacement. The effect of CEO
replacement is weaker when a large percentage of the
firm’s inputs come from the supplier and when the firm has
been working with the supplier for many years. This sug-
gests that when the supplier has more bargaining power, it
can mitigate the firm’s efforts to cut costs or renegotiate
the implicit contract that governs the relationship. The
authors also find that the negative effect on the suppliers’
sales is worse when the CEO departure was forced and
when the new CEO is an outside appointment.6
Customers and suppliers as firm monitors and
certifiers
Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008) propose that customers
and suppliers can closely monitor the firm, for example, by
regularly requiring financial information. As a result,
competition and the presence of strong supplier-customer
relations can be a substitute for the market for capital
control as governance mechanisms. These authors find that
firms that operate in a competitive environment and have
strong supplier-customer relations tend to have more
takeover defences than firms that operate in a less
competitive environment or firms that do not have strong
supplier-customer relations.7
The empirical findings in Patatoukas (2012) are consis-
tent with the intuition that a customer can efficiently
monitor the supplier. Patatoukas (2012) finds that firms that
rely on a few big customers experience a higher accounting
rate of return, and operate more efficiently in terms of
selling, general, and administrative expenses, cash con-
version cycle, and inventory turnover. Furthermore, the
change in customer concentration is a leading indicator of
changes in rate of return, profit margins, and asset turn-
over. These findings support the hypothesis that customer6 This result is consistent with extant literature suggesting that
firms on average experience an increase in operating performance
with a forced CEO departure or an outside appointment.
7 Unlike previous research Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008) cate-
gorized industries in relationship and non-relationship industries at
the 2-digit SIC code level in order to measure the supplier-customer
relation.
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customer relation through more information sharing, and
more collaboration in marketing and advertising efforts.
Johnson et al. (2010) develop the idea that large publicly
traded customers have a certifying role in their supplier’s
initial public offering (IPO). The intuition is that large
customers are likely to have access to the supplier’s pro-
prietary information and operations, even more so if there
are other contractual links between the two firms, such as
customer’s equity ownership in the supplier, long-term
purchasing agreements, or strategic alliances.8 The main
result of the study is that, consistent with the hypothesis,
IPO firms with large customers experience a higher IPO
valuation and exhibit better long term operating perfor-
mance. These effects are stronger when there are inter-
firm arrangements, and when the product is unique. The
results also tend to be stronger if there are no other
certifying mechanisms such as a venture capitalist or a
highly competitive market.
Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen (2011) argue that a hostile
takeover can adversely affect a firm by disrupting its long
term relationships. Thus, when there is a high threat of a
hostile takeover, it can be hard for a firm to establish re-
lations with customers and suppliers, and it can become
more difficult to attract necessary levels of RSI.9 Consistent
with the hypothesis that the threat of a hostile takeover
imposes ex-ante costs on the firm, the authors find that the
threat of a hostile takeover is detrimental to the perfor-
mance of firms that have a major customer. They also find
that a reduction in the takeover threat is associated with a
higher number of principal customers, an increase in the
percentage sales to those customers, and an increase in the
probability that the relation with the customer will
continue in the future.
Along similar lines, Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi (2013)
investigate the role of takeover defences as a bonding
mechanism between the firm and its customers and sup-
pliers. Relationship specific investments are regulated, at
least in part, by implicit self-enforcing contracts. Extant
research (Telser (1980) and Bull (1987)) suggests that the
parties to such an agreement have the incentive to abide by
the contract if a contract breach results in loss of reputa-
tion. Moreover, the manager’s personal commitment, and
thus her reputation, loses value if the manager is replaced
in a takeover. Thus, the bonding hypothesis proposed by
Johnson, et al. (2013) suggests that takeover defences
make the implicit contracts between the firm and its cus-
tomers and suppliers feasible by protecting the manager
from takeover threats, thus preserving the value of the
manager’s commitments. The authors test this hypothesis
on a sample of IPOs; and consistent with the bonding8 Partial equity ownership is an organizational form alternative to
explicit and implicit contracting between customers and suppliers.
Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) find that customers’ equity
stakes in their suppliers are rare, and seem to be driven by both
contractual frictions and suppliers’ financial constraints.
9 Ex-post hold-up problems and opportunism can reduce a firm’s
incentive to attract relationship specific investments (Grossman &
Hart, 1986). Long-term implicit contracts can reduce these agency
costs.hypothesis they find that not only do IPO firms employ, on
average, more takeover defences when they have major
customers or suppliers, but also that, in those cases, the
value of the IPO increases with the number of takeover
defences.
Summary and concluding remarks
Jensen and Meckling (1976) described the modern corpo-
ration as a nexus of contracts. Most subsequent literature
implicitly assumed that a firm makes its financial decisions
to reflect firm characteristics as well as the interests of
those stakeholders, such as shareholders and bondholders,
who are bound to the firm by explicit contracts. In devel-
oping a rationale for the importance of indirect bankruptcy
costs to a firm’s capital structure decision, Titman (1984)
theoretically motivated the role that the interests of a
firm’s customers and suppliers play in the determination of
the firm’s capital structure decision. In a thought-provoking
paper, Zingales (2000) outlines how a firm’s financial de-
cisions are affected when we consider not only those with
whom there are explicit contracts, but also those entities
with whom the firm is bound by implicit contracts. Since
then, there has been a considerable amount of theoretical
and empirical literature that has examined how relation-
ships governed by implicit contracting affect corporate
policies regarding capital structure, dividends, investment,
and others.
In this paper, the focus is on the role of one class of
agents with whom the firm’s relationship is governed pri-
marily by implicit contracts. We have tried to provide an
overview of the basic theoretical framework that generates
the relations between a firm’s policies and such economi-
cally linked entities. One general theme is that economi-
cally linked agents bear costs if the firm enters financial
distress and, therefore, actions on the part of the firm, such
as greater leverage, that increase the likelihood of distress
result in supplier/customer firms taking a more conserva-
tive approach in the relationship. The other general theme
is that relations between economically linked firms
generate a surplus, and the sharing of this surplus depends
on the relative bargaining strengths of the firm and those
that are linked to it. Because a firm’s financial decisions can
significantly affect the magnitude of this surplus and alter
its relative bargaining power, there will be an association
between corporate financial policies and the behaviour of
its economically linked firms. We then describe several
empirical studies that lend strong support to the pre-
dictions of these theories.
The value of a firm crucially depends on the efficiency of
its relations with firms and entities that are economically
linked to it. These linkages can cover a firm’s labour, rivals,
suppliers, and customers. The research that we describe in
this article focuses on suppliers and customers and iden-
tifies the various channels through which a firm affects and
is affected by the characteristics of the up- and down-
stream firms in the vertical supply chain. To the extent that
a firm’s value is affected by its relations with suppliers and
customers, obtaining a better understanding of the effects
of these relations should help managers to manage their
firms better and maximize value.
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